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Abstract: Despite international legal consensus declaring the separation wall in Palestine/Israel
as illegal, Israel has continued this geopolitical project unchallenged. Examining the judicial
decisions of the International Court of Justice and Israel’s High Court of Justice on the wall
reveals that Israel’s project, which began in 2002, was motivated by a political desire to protect
illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, confiscate Palestinian land, and constrict their
movement and space. Analyzing the entirety of the wall through the lens of containment
illuminates how the wall’s fracturing of Palestinian land created the material conditions, or the
‘facts on the ground’, for Israel’s political objectives manifested in the Trump administration’s
“deal of the century” announced in 2020. Comparing maps of the wall throughout Palestine to
the map of the proposed future of Israel/Palestine by the recent plan, its juxtaposition reveals
how Israel’s project set the foundation for actualizing further colonial land confiscation in
Palestine. The result of judicial deliberation was a wall seen by Israel’s eye as humanitarianly
and proportionally considered by its courts, which allowed it to withstand international criticism
while maintaining its purpose to actualize its geopolitical objectives.
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“Is it for this that we have established a country? Is it for this that we have gathered from
every corner of the world, the survivors of regimes that persecuted us, discriminated against
us and denied us every possible right simply because our origin, in order to establish a state
whose army will implement a discriminatory regime over millions who are not us?”
(Michael Sfard, 2006)
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Fifteen years after the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion that declared Israel’s
separation barrier in the West Bank as illegal under international law, Israel has continued this
project relatively unchallenged. 1 The planned route of the barrier, which includes sections already
constructed, under construction, and awaiting construction, is some 435 miles long – more than
twice the length of the Green Line, the internationally recognized border between Israel and the
West Bank. 2 In fact, 85 percent of the separation barrier is constructed in the West Bank without
consultation of the Palestinian Authority leading to over a decade of legal challenges on the
legitimacy of an occupying power significantly altering the territory in which it occupies. 3 The wall
symbolizes a dialectic of “an ever-radicalizing Palestinian struggle and an ever-deepening Israeli
oppression, causing ever-growing levels of human misery, mainly – but not only – among
Palestinians.” 4 While there is a wide range of choices for terminology when discussing the separation
barrier, anywhere from ‘security fence’ to ‘apartheid wall’, I will mainly refer to the structure as the
separation barrier as “it constitutes a physical system of separation that includes several components,
among them fences and walls” 5, and more specifically a “series of wall; barrier; electric fences; and
security zones of barbed wire, ditches, motion sensors, and surveillance cameras.” 6 Though, I may
use any of these terms interchangeably. This essay will perform three primary functions – first, to
provide an explanation of the state of the second intifada before the implementation of the
separation barrier to understand the context for its development. Second, this paper seeks to
provide a historiography of the formation of the separation barrier, with a special emphasis on the
role of both Israeli and international legal structures in influencing the barrier’s route and reception.
Third, this paper explores the consequential effects and ramifications that the separation barrier has
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on individual Palestinians, the future possibility of a sovereign Palestinian state, and the ongoing
colonial occupation of Palestine.
The Second Intifada & the Separation Principle
The separation barrier was begun by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the midst of the
second intifada. Just two months after the failure of the Camp David negotiations that left many
prominent issues for Palestinians unaddressed, Sharon’s provocative visit to al-Haram alSharif/Temple Mount on September 28, 2000 triggered Palestinian demonstrations and Israeli
military suppression that compounded into a much bloodier intifada than the previous. 7 Between
September 28th 2000 and January 31st 2006, just under a thousand Israeli’s were killed in attacks or
bombings, a majority civilians, in which the Ministry of Defense and Israeli politicians said “the
objectives of the ‘security barrier’ were to prevent the infiltration of terrorists, forbid the entry of
clandestine arms and explosives, and protect the lives of 6.7 million Israeli citizens.” 8 It is important
to note in the same period of time, Israeli military operations killed roughly 3,400 Palestinians. Due
to political disagreement on the outline of the barrier, Sharon placed Netzah Mashiah, head of the
Ministry of Defense, in charge to direct the construction of the barrier in the spring of 2002.
Mashiah framed Israel’s stance on the separation barrier “from the principle that this barrier is
temporary. And that the length of time it stays up depends on how the Palestinians work toward
peace. So, it can stay here five minutes or five decades.” 9
Under the guise of protecting its citizens against suicide bombings and other terrorist
attacks, Israel advanced a settlement plan that built a separation barrier mainly inside the West Bank.
To construct the barrier, the Israeli military who occupies the West Bank issued land seizure military
orders that seized private Palestinian land – a process that began even before the earliest
government resolution approving the barrier. 10 Though it was framed as temporary and a necessary
security measure, the barrier’s deep construction into the West Bank shows how it’s planned route
was “a political weapon to confiscate land and thus constrict Palestinian space,” functionally a
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controlling apparatus. 11 The barrier’s construction toward the east of illegal Israeli settlements in the
West Bank makes it easier for their potential annexation in the future. Israeli human rights attorney
Michael Sfard describes that Israel’s separation barrier project “may hold the title for the most
cynical manipulation of pain caused by suicide terrorism.” 12 Fifteen years later, the separation barrier
is much more of a permanent reality for Palestinians than temporary. Echoing Agamben’s insight on
the analysis of the state of emergency, the separation barrier symbolizes a state of exception, where
the state’s temporary suspension of the law becomes a state of permanence. In this way, when
temporariness “is both the method and the law, the military can portray every action as a response
to emergency and Israeli civilian society can ignore every evil.” 13 The separation barrier was a part of
Sharon’s broader disengagement plan that was a U-turn from both his personal stance and Israeli
policy in the Occupied Territories (OT) that was result from:
the contradictions of Israel’s regime have grown to a point where they can no longer be
reconciled or ignored without escalating international and local costs. This has now required
a major tactical change in order to maintain the Israeli ethnocratic system. The recent steps
represent a new phase, a new method, to pursue an age-old goal of Zionism: to maximize
the Judaization of Palestine while maintaining Israel’s image as a ‘normal’, democratic
nation-state. 14
This change in the way in which Israel managed its occupation of the OT is demonstrated best by
the separation barrier.
Prior to the first intifada, Israel controlled all aspects of Palestinian life under occupation.
The Oslo period signified a transition from a colonization principle to a separation principle
according to Israeli scholar Neve Gordon. Whereas the colonization principle is guided by
biopolitics, or the power to manage and maintain life, the separation principle has been
characterized by an abandonment of life, guided by the sovereign power’s ability to let or make die. 15
This dramatic change in the way in which Israel controls the OT wasn’t primarily from changes,
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replacements, or modifications of controlling mechanisms and tactics – but rather, from a shift in
emphasis on modes of power: biopower to sovereign power. The Oslo period demonstrated this
shift toward the separation principle where Israel shed its biopolitical responsibility to administer the
lives of Palestinians by “subcontracting” that role to the Palestinian Authority (PA) while retaining
full control over security. Gordon highlights that this “signified the reorganization of power rather
than its withdrawal and should be understood as the continuation of the occupation by other
means”. 16 In contrast from the colonization principle, the separation principle is solely interested in
the resources in a colonized territory, and not the people on it. This is demonstrated by Israel’s
military attacks on the PA and its’ infrastructure during the second intifada, rendering its own
subcontractor totally dysfunctional. In this way, Palestinians represent the homo sacer: one who may
be killed without due process and without the killer being punished. 17
Judicial Challenges & Legitimacy
The role of law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a hierarchical quagmire of different
layers of legal applicability. Law in the OT is composed of what was in effect prior to Israel’s
occupation (Jordanian and Egyptian laws, British Mandate laws before that, and Ottoman laws
before that), Israeli military law, Israeli administrative law, and international laws of occupation. 18
Though Israel has maintained the position that the OT are “disputed” territory, and therefore unapplicable to the laws of occupation, the majority of the international community recognizes the
occupation and Israel has already voluntarily took up humanitarian provisions of these laws. Legal
institutions have had a significant influence on the separation barrier, both internally to resolve
conflicts and externally to determine international legality. Because Israel’s military commander in
the OT can decree new legislative orders, such as for the confiscation of Palestinian land and/or the
construction of the separation barrier, legal petitions challenging such actions by the Israeli military
were heard by Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ). The HCJ has been an instrument in regulating
the occupation and alleviating the worst effects of military violence, “in doing so to aid the Israeli
state’s argument that it applies the rule of law fairly and indifferently in all cases, including those of
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occupied Palestinians.” 19 In order to understand how the HCJ has either contributed or damaged
human rights, “one must examine the Court’s role in strengthening or weakening the occupation as
a legal and political entity… the assessor of the Court’s jurisprudence and of human rights legal
activity will have to consider the effect they both have on the sustainability and durability of the
occupation.” 20
The High Court of Justice is the administrative bench to the Israeli Supreme Court and
considers direct civilian petitions against state authorities. The HCJ has the power to issue
injunctions, mandatory orders, and other orders commanding state and local authorities to act or
refrain from acting. 21 The HCJ became the site of internal legal challenges to the construction of the
separation barrier, balancing security concerns of the Israeli state and military and the rights of
Palestinians on the other. One of the first prominent cases that the HCJ ruled on came from a
petition from Palestinian villagers from Beit Sourik, just north-west outside Jerusalem. The Israeli
military’s route and construction for the part of the separation barrier in question left 43 percent of
the Beit Sourik villagers cultivable land west of the separation barrier, on the ‘Israeli side’. 22 The
HCJ’s role was to an issue a judgement on whether the military commander had the power to seize
private Palestinian land to build the separation barrier, and whether the barrier’s route was lawfully
set. The petitioners argued the motivation behind the separation barrier wasn’t simply security, but a
political desire to envelop illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank into Israel – or de facto
annexation – among the other harms it brought the villagers. On the first legal question, the HCJ
lead by Chief Justice Barak reiterated Israel’s position that the seizure of private Palestinian land is
allowed for security purposes, as granted by 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention, and therefore rejected charges of annexation. 23 On the second question, the HCJ sided
with the petitioners argument – that the original route causes irreparable harm to Palestinian
villagers, their rights, and livelihoods. The legal challengers made their argument through an
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alternative route proposal that addresses the proportional limits of security concerns and Palestinian
rights better than the military’s original route. Proportionality became a defining feature in legal
challenges to the separation barrier, “balancing the accrued common good of one population against
the lesser evil done to another population.” 24 In this way, the legal challengers to the separation
barrier itself demonstrated a potential lesser evil alternative that manifested in what Weizman calls
“the best of all possible walls”, extending it humanitarian legitimacy. The HCJ struck down 75
percent of the military’s route (some 18 miles of the barrier) in light of plausible alternatives to
accommodate Palestinians petitions in June 2004. Seven months later, the Israeli military proposed
another route that would only cut off the Beit Sourik villagers from some 7 square miles of their
land, but when the villagers from Beit Sourik petitioned again, the court maintained the military’s
second route. 25
Beyond Israeli courts, the separation barrier was also receiving international attention and
deliberation. In 2003, the UN special rapporteur of the Palestinian Occupied Territories issued a
report that found the barrier unlawful for the reason of de facto annexation, the grave harm to
Palestinian rights, and the absence of a legitimate military need to deviate from the Green Line
(given the illegality of the settlements). A United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution
followed the report demanding Israel dismantle any part of the separation barrier that deviates from
the internationally recognized border, but the US invoked its veto power. On December 8, 2003 the
UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) “which does not have the enforcement power of an operative order,” but
“could cause Israel significant diplomatic difficulties.” 26 Different from how the Israeli courts
considered the barrier, the ICJ ruled on the entirety of the separation barrier rather than a sectionby-section analysis that the HCJ followed (which also allows multiple legal challenges and results).
Further, the ICJ also focused on the concern of settlements that the HCJ carefully avoided ruling on,
in which the ICJ re-iterated the international community’s stance that the illegal settlements cannot
be a justification for the barrier’s illegal deviation from the Green Line. 27 Finding that 80 percent of
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Israeli settlers would reside within the fenced and walled area, the ICJ argued this demonstrates a
political motivation to create a fait accompli where the land west of the barrier, but east of the Green
Line (the seam zone) is under Israeli control. The advisory opinion was 64 pages long and had five
conclusions: first, that the separation barrier project violates international law; second, Israel should
dismantle the barrier and undo legislation and regulations concerning it; third, Israel should pay
reparations for the damages the wall has caused; fourth, all states should recognize Israel’s barrier
construction as illegal and not aid or assist them; and fifth, the UN General Assembly and Security
Council should consider how to end the illegal situation the advisory opinion notes. 28 Eleven days
after the ICJ submitted its advisory opinion, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution ES10/15 during an emergency session that demanded that Israel and all UN member states comply
with their legal obligations mentioned in the advisory opinion and requests that the secretary-general
establish a register of damage caused. However, UN General Assembly resolutions are not binding,
and the Security Council never voted on a resolution on the content of the advisory opinion after its
release. The ICJ’s advisory opinion in June 2004 represented the international consensus on the
legality of Israel’s separation barrier project, isolating Israel in its defense of ignoring international
law. Interestingly, the High Court of Justice’s ruling on the Beit Sourik case came nine days before
the ICJ’s advisory opinion – both judgements, so close to each other, didn’t regard the other.
The Israeli courts, such as the HCJ, do not only listen to the petitions from Palestinians, but
begrudged Israeli settlers as well. Such was the case when the Alfei Menashe settlers petitioned the
Court on the original June 2002 barrier route that would have left them outside it. Their petition
resulted in the HCJ re-routing the fence to include the settlement in the barrier’s enclave, but
resulted in the Palestinian towns of Qalqilyah and Habla to be cut apart by the re-route of the
barrier. 29 The Association of Civil Rights (ACRI), an Israeli NGO, offered legal aid to the
Palestinians affected, borrowing arguments made in the recent ICJ advisory opinion. Their argument
was that the barrier’s re-routing was unlawful because it caused a disproportionate violation on
Palestinian rights, failed to meet a genuine security need, and amounted to de facto annexation. On
whether Israel has to protect the rights of settlers, such as those in Alfei Menashe, their response
was “Military need serves the occupying power or its forces, not its citizens who choose to relocate
to the OT; their protection should not involve impingements on the rights of the occupied
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population.” 30 In fact, the human rights organization B’tselem estimated the barrier would negatively
affect the livelihood of at least 300,000 Palestinians and irreversibly damage the economic prospects
of a future Palestinian state. 31 In the HCJ’s judgement in September 2005, Barak’s opinion rejected
the totalizing view of the barrier, maintaining that a segment-by-segment analysis was necessary to
consider the military’s security narrative for the routing. He maintained the security justification for
land seizures for barrier construction but rejected only certain parts of the fence to appease both
Palestinian petitioners and the Israeli public. 32
An issue with applying international law of war such as the 1907 Hague Convention to
Israel/Palestine, according to Eyal Weizman, is that
it presumes separate and defined states. Symmetrical wars between state actors can be long
but tend to have clear beginnings and ends. In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, like
other past and present colonial conflicts, is an ever- and always present asymmetrical, lowintensity conflict between a state and quasi-state actors. 33
But in effect, the HCJ’s rulings allowed military/security needs granted under Hague Convention
proportionally to the rights Israel must protect of the occupied population under the Fourth Geneva
Convention. When completed, 85 percent of Israeli settlers will have the barrier protecting them. It
was only due to legal challenges to the HCJ that slimmed the estimated 16 percent of land in the
West Bank that would be trapped between the 1967 border and the separation barrier to 8 percent. 34
The judgements issued in notable cases such as Beit Sourik, Alfei Menashe, Zufin, and Bil’in were
exceptions in the fact that they provided some relief to Palestinian petitioners. But the end results
were final barrier routes with the HCJ’s seal of approval, demonstrating how legal activism against
the barrier has helped Israel maintain legitimacy on the question. 35 The metric of proportionality in
the application of international law on the separation barrier represents “elastic zones of discretion”
where the lesser evil argument is used to “subvert the law’s absolute provisions and subject them to
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malleable cost-benefit calculations.” 36 While some individual redress was made for Palestinian
villages through legal challenges, the process resulted in the construction of the best of all possible walls
that maintains legitimacy despite international legal opinion saying otherwise.
Containment & ‘Creeping Apartheid’
The separation barrier has resulted in a series of material harms to Palestinians and
constitutes a broader ‘containment’ strategy by the Israeli state. The imposed permit regime that
authorizes movement around the barrier and through the series of checkpoints throughout the West
Bank constrains Palestinians freedom of movement. Whereas Israelis can travel through the seam
zone with no need of a permit, Palestinians are only allowed legal entry in the seam zone if they have
received a military issued permit that can take up to a year to obtain – leaving parts of the West
Bank inaccessible. As result, the seam zone is governed on the basis of separation and discrimination
off of nationality and amounts to de facto annexation of the seam zone for predominantly Israeli
use. 37 The separation barrier and its series of checkpoints and obstacles have ravaged the Palestinian
economy. From 2000 to 2007 the unemployment rate in the West Bank rose from 15 percent to 17
percent respectively, while close to 800,000 residents of the West Bank needed UN food assistance
in 2008. Further, the Palestinian GDP declined 10 percent between 2006 to 2007, and another 10
percent between 2007 to 2008. 38 Beyond economic implications, a UN document from September
2008 found that 60 percent of Palestinians attempting to enter Jerusalem to go to the al-Aqsa
mosque during Ramadan were not authorized and were denied access. 39 The result of the separation
barrier project is a strategy that maintains Jewish demographic majority, minimizes interaction and
maximizes separation, and acquires colonial possessions via de facto annexation or the possibility of
annexation beyond East Jerusalem in the future. The barrier’s massive deviation from the Green
Line underscores that a major objective is to create facts on the ground that essentially redraw the
border between Israel and the West Bank. The route “aims to mitigate the consequences of Israel’s
massive settlement project, whose goal has been to colonize the land without incorporating the

36

Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils, pp 91.

37

Sfard, The Wall and the Gate, pp 269.

38

Backmann, A Wall in Palestine, pp 139.

39

Ibid.
10

occupied inhabitants into the Israel demos.” 40 Overall, the separation barrier functions as a system
of containment.
Many concepts and theories have been used to describe and understand the separation
barrier’s role in the ongoing colonial occupation of Palestine. The unilateral imposition of the barrier
to demarcate ethnocratic lines and distinctions has drawn claims that Israel is moving closer to
“creeping apartheid”. 41 Unfolding without any declaration, ethnic stratification is creeping both
outwards (in the expansionist sense discussed) and inwards (with increased legal controls on
Palestinian Israeli citizens). This has even been described as spacio-cidal, as opposed to genocidal, in
that it “targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian
population, primarily by targeting the space in which the Palestinian people live.” 42 Demonstrated by
the military issuing land seizure orders, this process of spacio-cide is an attempt to seize and
‘Judaize’ as much land as possible, and isolate Palestinians into the smallest space possible through
containment. The separation barrier symbolizes the way in which the law is used to legitimate this
colonial violence. International law, Israeli law, and the systems of courts are not spaces outside of
the conflict, but rather battlegrounds internal to it. Weizman describes this as lawfare, when the law
is used as a weapon of war, as a “strategy of using, or misusing, law as a substitute for traditional
military means to achieve an operational objective.” 43 Drawing from Walter Benjamin’s observations
on military violence as “primordial and paradigmatic of all violence”, Weizman shows the separation
barrier’s violence has also embodied a lawmaking character.
The containment strategy has profound implications for the future national aspirations for a
Palestinian state. Instead of a complete strategy of separation, the barrier created an archipelago of
isolated areas that would mean any future Palestinian state would be landlocked and contained by an
Israeli state. 44 Prioritizing retaining areas of high Jewish presence and shedding responsibility for
high Arab populated areas, not only does this reify ethnic divisions and separation but it
concentrates “Palestine” into three to five main regions (including the Gaza Strip) almost completely
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closed off from one another. 45 The legal processes’ consideration of proportionality “forensically
engineered” the separation barrier. If it does mark the territory of a future Palestinian state, it would
be the first time humanitarian lawyers co-designed the borders. 46 When alternative routes of the
barrier were approved to alleviate some Palestinian harm, the end route is seen as a feature of the
banality of participatory design “rather than seeing that as a part of the same instruments of brutal
violation, repression, and dispossession.” 47 Another way to see the containment strategy is to
prevent a Palestinian state from coming to fruition in the first place. The separation barrier creates
contradictions in both a potential one or two state solution, a fuite en avant. 48 Prime Minister Sharon’s
senior advisor, Weisglass, said:
the meaning of the disengagement plan is a freeze to the diplomatic process with the
Palestinians… When you freeze the political process, you prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian state and you prevent a discussion on the subject of refugees, borders and
Jerusalem… The vast majority of West Bank settlers will stay in their place forever… This
whole package called ‘the Palestinian state’ has been removed from the daily agenda for an
unlimited period of time. 49
Whether a future Palestinian state remains an unimaginable reality or a potential possibility, Israel
has utilized the separation barrier for a geopolitical strategy of containment that maximizes the
interests of Israelis over the rights and future of Palestinians.
Conclusion
Michael Sfard recalls Abraham Heschel’s words that “In a free society, some are guilty, all
are responsible.” He connects this distinction between guilt and responsibility to the Jewish notion
of tikkun olam, or healing the world. 50 The process of engaging in healing is only possible if all take
responsibility, regardless of the culpability or guilt of oneself. What does tikkun olam mean or look
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like in regards to the separation barrier? At the very least, it begins with a recognition that the
separation barrier is not merely a benign, temporary security feature but a geopolitically motivated
infrastructure of control, whose function is to expand colonial acquisitions and contain, isolate, and
restrict Palestinians. In November 2007, in an exchange of words between Sfard and the HCJ’s
President Beinisch during a hearing, Beinisch asked “Must we use this word?” in reference to the
word apartheid being used in court to discuss the barrier. Sfard replied, “And if I don’t use it, will it
disappear?” 51
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